This paper examines how policy governing the liner shipping sector affects maritime transport costs and seaborne trade flows. The paper uses a novel data set and finds that restrictions, particularly on foreign investment, increase maritime transport costs, strongly but unevenly. The cost-inflating effect ranges from 24 to 50 percent and trade on some routes may be inhibited altogether. This paper is a product of the Trade and International Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at I.Borchert@sussex.ac.uk, fabien.bertho@sciences-po.org, and amattoo@worldbank.org.
Introduction
Since most manufactured and semi-manufactured goods are transported in liner vessels, access to efficient and competitive liner shipping is crucial for a country's engagement in international trade. In fact, maritime transport costs (MTCs) today matter more than tariffs.
Ad valorem MTCs of exports to the United States are on average more than three times higher than the average US tariff, and in New Zealand are more than twice as high. 1 The current perception is that the scope for lowering MTCs through policy reform is limited because the market for maritime liner shipping services is largely free of distortions. Governments now generally desist from both sins of commission, such as reserving cargo for national shipping lines, and sins of omission, such as exempting liner conferences from competition policy.
However, a new services trade restrictions database reveals that protection persists. It now takes the form more often of restrictions on foreign investment in maritime transport services than of restrictions on cross-border trade or port services, which have been the focus of the existing literature.
This paper seeks to assess the impact on MTCs and seaborne trade flows of policy measures currently affecting trade in liner shipping services, with a focus on hitherto neglected restrictions on foreign investment or commercial presence -'mode 3' in WTO parlance.'
There are two principal reasons for this focus. First, the most significant barriers to crossborder trade (i.e. 'mode 1' in WTO terms) have indeed diminished in significance. Cargo reservations only affect a few specific goods and cover a tiny share of total seaborne trade, and many countries have narrowed the scope of exemptions from competition law for liner transport. Therefore, the total impact of mode 1 measures on MTCs is likely to be small.
Second, even though cross-border trade is the key mode of supply for international shipping services, the ability to establish a commercial presence is crucial for an efficient provision of liner shipping services. Thus, provisions governing mode 3 are likely to affect maritime transport costs and trade flows.
The focus on policy barriers to foreign investment in the shipping sector addresses a blind spot in the existing literature on the determinants of maritime transport costs. One strand of the literature has studied aspects revolving around infrastructure and connectivity. In their seminal paper, Limao and Venables (2001) look at the quality of transport infrastructure as a whole. Other papers take up specific aspects of infrastructure such as port efficiency (Sanchez et al. 2003) , different port characteristics , or port infrastructure endowments (Wilmsmeier and Hoffmann 2008) . The latter paper also addresses aspects of connectivity between ports, 2 as do Marquez-Ramos et al. (2006) . In contrast, few papers investigate public policy. For instance, Wilmsmeier and MartinezZarzoso (2010) focus on the impact of being an open registry country whereas Clark et al. (2004) study the impact of anti-competitive practices in the liner shipping sector. Fink et al. (2002) quantify the effect of certain policies relative to other determinants of trade costs and find that both public policy-in the form of mandatory port services-as well as private anticompetitive practices have a substantial effect on transport costs.
This paper makes three principal contributions: first, we estimate the impact of restrictions on maritime transport costs and seaborne trade flows, highlighting in particular the role of investment barriers which have not been studied before. Second, we examine how distance affects maritime transport costs and, hence, seaborne trade flows. Third, we trace out how the impact of policy barriers on maritime transport costs itself varies with distance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to focus attention on the cost-inflating effect of a comprehensive set of measures, and to disentangle the various channels linking policy, distance, transport costs and trade flows.
We find that more restrictive liner shipping policies are associated with appreciably higher shipping costs, and investment restrictions matter most. Specifically, maritime transport costs are between 24 and 50 percent higher compared to 'open' routes, depending on the level of restrictiveness. Along the extensive margin, the probability of observing bilateral trade is between 17 and 25 percentage points lower on routes with policy barriers as compared to open routes. Thus, the cost-inflating effect is substantial in magnitude and, as we show below, varies with distance. In terms of the derived effect on seaborne trade, we estimate that policy barriers lower trade flows by 28 to 46 percent, primarily through raising transport costs.
Turning to the effect of distance, our estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in distance leads on average to a 2.3 percent increase in maritime transport costs. Distance affects seaborne trade mainly through its impact on maritime trade costs.
Third, while for any given distance, restrictive liner shipping policies are associated with higher maritime transport costs, there is heterogeneity in this effect along the distance dimension. The cost-inflating effect is negatively related to distance. negotiations. This paper's findings suggest that the lack of progress in these negotiations leaves in place serious impediments to countries' integration into global markets. Breaking the stalemate in regional and multilateral negotiating fora could lead to potentially large gains from policy reform.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes policy barriers to trade and investment in the liner shipping sector. Section 3 presents the data and estimation methodology. In Section 4 we estimate the effect of policy measures in a maritime transport cost equation, and in Section 5 we use those results to estimate the impact of transport costs on trade flows in a gravity framework. Section 6 concludes and offers policy recommendations.
Policy Barriers to Trade in Maritime Shipping Services
We consider four types of potentially cost-increasing policy measures: cargo reservations and the operation of liner conferences, both of which affect cross-border shipping services; port and terminal usage fees on both ends of a route; and policy restrictions on establishing commercial presence. Taking a comprehensive view on policy measures allows us to gauge the relative importance of each type of measure, whereas previous papers have mostly studied some of these types of measures in isolation. While port usage costs are measured in dollar terms and are readily available from the World Bank's Doing Business database, the nature of other policy measures is less straightforward. This section therefore provides a brief background on such measures and how they interact.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) defines trade as taking place through different modes of supply, two of which are most relevant to maritime trade. Cross-border trade (or mode 1) takes place when a maritime transport company from country A provides a service to a consumer resident in country B. Mode 1 is the key mode of supply for shipping services and has received greatest attention in previous research. The other relevant mode is the supply of a service through the establishment of commercial presence (or mode 3). A full commitment in mode 3 means that a country allows foreign firms to invest and establish local subsidiaries, branches or representative offices and imposes no restriction on their operation.
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Government barriers in mode 1: Cargo reservations
The main restrictions on cross-border trade (mode 1) take the form of cargo reservations or cargo preferences. These restrictions specify that some types of cargo can only be transported by some types of vessels, in general by vessels flying the country's flag or by vessels operated by national or domestic shipping lines. Over the past decades, most cargo reservations have disappeared (Fink et al. 2002) so that nowadays cargo reservations are likely to affect only a small part of world seaborne trade. For instance, in the US the volume of cargo transported under preference schemes represented around 1.5 percent of the total seaborne trade in 2005-07 (Bertho, 2011) . In Brazil, 0.18 percent of total seaborne import tonnage was reserved for
Brazilian flagged-vessels in 2009.
Private anti-competitive practices in mode 1
3 Since today most international cargo can be transported irrespective of the vessel's flag, and since "deflagging" has spread, the establishment of a registered company for the purpose of operating a fleet under the national flag is less and less relevant (UNCTAD, 2011) . This paper instead focuses on "the ability of international maritime transport service suppliers to undertake all activities which are necessary for the supply of a partially or fully integrated transport service, within which maritime transport constitutes a substantial element" (Draft Schedule on Maritime Transport Services mode 3b).
Historically, on many maritime routes liner shipping companies were allowed to cooperate on prices, capacities or schedules ("liner conferences" 
Barriers to trade in mode 3: commercial presence
The impact of investment restrictions in the shipping sector has not been studied in the literature. Data unavailability may have been the main reason but it also seems the case that the complementarity between cross-border trade in shipping services and commercial presence has not been fully appreciated. In tramp shipping, tankers or dry bulk carriers are chartered by a single customer and so the transaction can easily be arranged by phone or via internet. In contrast, in the liner shipping segment a company needs hundreds or even thousands of customers to fill a container ship or general cargo vessel (Bertho, 2013) . It is much more difficult to manage ten thousand boxes pertaining to ten thousand customers than ten thousand tonnes of crude oil pertaining to one customer. The development of a network of offices by establishing a commercial presence can greatly facilitate the administration and organization of vessels' calls as well as the management of cargo. Second, international transport increasingly takes the form of "door-to-door" or multimodal delivery. It is therefore important for maritime companies to establish a commercial presence abroad in order to have their own inland transport facilities or to develop partnerships with local transportation firms to facilitate the hinterland leg from the port to the final delivery point.
To obtain data on such mode 3 restrictions, we draw on the Services Trade Restrictions
Database (Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo 2014) which provides detailed information on the incidence of policy measures in a number of services sectors, including maritime shipping. 
Data and Empirical Strategy
We first describe the construction of the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) for liner shipping, and then our estimation strategy.
Liner Shipping STRI: Data and Methodology
In order to incorporate multiple policy barriers to commercial presence as shown in Table 1, we construct a country-pair specific quantitative score (the liner shipping STRI) that reflects the restrictiveness of policy regimes applied at both ends of a given journey. The approach adopted in this paper builds on a relatively long tradition in the literature of quantifying policy barriers (Deardorff and Stern, 2008) of scoring the relative restrictiveness of specific policy measures and then constructing a weighted average of underlying scores. The scoring approach to quantification was first developed by the Australian Productivity Commission and used widely in work undertaken by the OECD 4 ; recent applications to the maritime transport sector were developed by McGuire et al. (2000) , Kimura et al. (2004) , Achy et al. (2005) and Li and Cheng (2007) . We combine the established methodology with the latest and most comprehensive information on applied service trade policies in the maritime shipping sector.
The construction of a liner shipping STRI proceeds in two principal steps: first individual policy measures relevant to the maritime shipping sector are selected, scored and aggregated for each country. Further details are provided in Annex 5. Figure 1 displays the liner shipping STRI by country and income group. As suggested in the literature, the liner shipping
sector is relatively open to foreign trade in comparison to other services sectors (Borchert et al., 2011; Kumar and Hoffmann, 2002 ), yet there is considerable variation across countries, which bodes well for identifying the impact of regulatory regimes. At the same time the index exhibits plausible correlations with some geographical characteristics; for instance, island countries for which international shipping is crucial tend to exhibit a low STRI (Australia, New Zealand, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago, one of the Caribbean's main maritime transport hubs). Second, country scores are combined-or 'bilateralized'-so as to obtain an indicator of restrictiveness that varies at the route level. Recall that activities specifically tied to having a commercial presence are administration and organization of vessels' calls, management of cargoes in ports of origin and destination, and administration and organization of hinterland transportation, all of which needs to work efficiently at both ends of a journey. Considering that potential policy barriers in ports of origin and destination add to each other, we obtain the bilateral STRI as the sum of origin and destination countries' indexes. 
Estimation Strategy and Related Data
Our approach is first to estimate the impact of liner shipping policies on bilateral MTCs, controlling for other determinants. In the second stage, we estimate the impact of transport costs on seaborne trade flows, again including relevant covariates.
In the first stage, we follow the model of liner shipping prices developed by Fink et al. (2002) and used in a number of subsequent papers. 6 In this model, the MTC for a product k on a maritime route between an origin country o and a destination d are assumed to be equal to the marginal cost of the service multiplied by a mark-up term. 7 The principal determinants of marginal costs and mark-ups in maritime shipping are distance, scale economies and policy barriers. Distance between the origin and destination has a straightforward effect on the marginal costs of transport through fuel, labor and other costs. At the same time, many maritime journeys between two countries are not direct and involve the "hub and spoke model" -i.e. long journeys between main ports performed by large vessels and cargo distribution within regions delegated to feeders after transhipment. We account for this feature of maritime shipping by including a transhipment variable in the MTC equation. The empirical relevance of doing so is illustrated by the fact that in our sample a direct service exists on 51 routes while transhipment is needed on 67 routes. Since maritime shipping is also understood to operate under increasing economies of scale, overall trade volume on a given route may affect transport costs. We address this issue by accounting for the aggregate bilateral country-pair volume of trade as well as for route-specific trade imbalances. (2002), Clark et al. (2004) and Wilmsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) . 7 The term 'MTC' is used in the literature even if it corresponds to the price paid by consumer of the service.
Here we follow this convention. 8 Maritime transport costs are directional and we wish to allow for the fact that a low 'backhaul' is crosssubsidised by charging a higher price on one leg of the journey.
We assume that distance, scale economies and policy barriers jointly determine costs for 
The dependent variable mtc odk represents the per-unit cost (in dollars per tonne) paid by the service's consumers, including the price of the transport, insurance costs and cargo handling but excluding customs charges. The product index k corresponds to containerizable goods disaggregated at the 2-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) classification. 9 In order to
obtain the most precise price data, we restrict the sample to two importing countries (and all their trade partners) which report import values in CIF as well as "value for duty," thereby allowing us to compute 'true' MTCs and sidestepping the problems afflicting CIF-FOB ratios (Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2006) . 10 We use the data computed by Korinek (2011) Before proceeding to the results for the transport costs equation, the censored nature of the dependent variable mtc odk needs to be emphasized as it is derived from trade flows and thus is missing for zero trade flow observations. Essentially transport costs do exist but are prohibitively high so that no trade is observed (Limao and Venables, 2001 ). Censoring affects around 50 percent of the sample. We address this issue by estimating a top-coded tobit model. Censored observations' missing MTC values are replaced by the highest value of transport costs observed in the dataset (Carson and Sun, 2007) .
11 One such institution is a country's stance on exempting liner conference from domestic competition law. In our particular sample the incidence of this institution is collinear with the country fixed effects and thus cannot be identified separately. 12 The number of origin countries is in the first instance constrained by the total number of countries in the Services Trade Restrictions Database (103), of which 22 are landlocked and thus drop out. In addition, for 13 EU member states, for which policy information is in principle available, trade flows cannot be tracked back to the port of entry through which they entered EU territory (typically Rotterdam), so they drop out as well. We end up with 65 exporters; the country sample is detailed in Annex 2.
First Stage: Estimating Maritime Transport Costs

Estimation Results
Results from estimating equation (1), i.e. the determinants of maritime transport costs, are presented in Table 2 . Model 1 includes control variables only. Distance, transhipment and total seaborne import volume variables are all highly significant. The trade imbalance variable is always insignificant, which could be due to the difficulty of identifying the relevant regional trade routes for a given country-pair. 13 The coefficients of natural trade barriers are all correctly signed and indicate, as we would expect, that increasing distance as well as the need for transhipment are cost-inflating whereas a higher total trade volume allows scale economies to be exploited, thereby lowering shipping costs.
In models 2-5, we consider the four principal types of potentially cost-increasing measures that have been observed: cargo reservations on cross-border shipping services (col.2), liner conferences on particular routes (col.3), fees and other terminal costs in the ports at both ends of the journey (col.4), and policy restrictions on establishing commercial presence in the countries involved (col.5). We find some evidence that cargo reservations and port costs are cost-inflating but investment restrictions exert a much stronger influence.
Our main results for the first stage of the inquiry are contained in column 6 where all potential determinants of maritime transport costs are jointly considered. We include indicator variables for quartiles of the STRI distribution and so do not restrict the effect of investment restrictions to be linear in our measure of restrictiveness. The coefficients associated with cargo reservations, liner conferences and port terminal costs are now insignificant but those associated with the liner shipping STRI are positive and significant at the 1 or 5 percent level.
The latter coefficients increase monotonically but the cost-inflating effect of policy barriers is not linear. The marginal effects of policy implied by the STRI coefficients in column 6 range from 24.1 to 49.7 percent at the median distance and thus are economically quite significant.
We provide a comprehensive discussion of the marginal effects of policy further below. (4) and (6) due to unavailability of information on port terminal costs in Bahrain, Egypt, India, Korea, Lebanon, Madagascar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Origin, destination and commodity fixed-effects as well as intercepts are included in all models but not reported.
We subject the results from the main specification to three further robustness checks. First, we check whether our results are affected by the potential endogeneity of MTC with respect to bilateral total trade volume. Using applied most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs and nonseaborne imports as instruments for seaborne import volumes leads only to minor changes in the coefficients (see Annex Table A .6); more importantly, the impact of the STRI liner shipping index remains significant and virtually unchanged in terms of magnitude. Hence, as the degree of endogeneity appears to be small while IV estimation is associated with efficiency losses, we conclude that model 6 is our preferred specification for estimating the MTC equation.
Second, in our sample we observe a number of minuscule trade flows that arise from the shipment of tiny physical quantities. The concern is that the distribution of per-unit transport costs is artificially inflated by these observations (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Harrigan 2010 ). Thus, we re-estimate model 6 after dropping all observations for which the physical weight reported is less than one metric tonne. 14 The results remain qualitatively unchanged; whilst the distance elasticity remains virtually identical, 15 the impact of policy barriers declines slightly but still ranges from 12 to 31.5 percent on average. A full tabulation of marginal effects for the restricted sample is available upon request.
Third, while the commodity fixed effects control, in principle, for alternative modes of transportation at the product level, especially by air, it is important to check for road transport because trade between neighboring countries in particular is more likely to be carried by road (Hummels, 2007) . We therefore check for competition from surface transport by dropping observations involving contiguous countries; this is the case of US-Mexican trade representing 85 observations. The results remain virtually unchanged.
Policy Impact
We now discuss in detail the implied marginal effects of policy, first holding distance fixed and then exploring how the effects vary across distance (Table 3) Moffitt decomposition' provides an elegant way of partitioning the marginal effect on the censored expectation into the constituent effects of covariate changes on the probability of 14 This affects 524 observations, or less than 6 percent of the sample. Observed average trade costs in this (potentially abnormal) subsample exceed the average in the rest of the sample by a factor of five. 15 The effect of the lower tobit coefficient is counter-balanced by the expected value of MTCs being considerably lower in the restricted sample. 16 Notice that the object of interest is the effect on the expected value of trade costs, E(MTC|x), whereas the econometric specification of the tobit model employs logged values of MTCs rather than levels. Since E(ln x) is not equal to ln(E(x)), the quantities of interest are not straightforward to obtain. Details on the computation of marginal effects are available upon request.
censoring and the truncated expected value, respectively. The non-standard form of our setup (right-censoring at a non-zero value with a dependent variable in logarithm) renders the McDonald-Moffitt decomposition not applicable. We therefore discuss the relevant margins separately. 
C. Change in censoring probability (percentage points)
Like the expected value of transport costs, the impact along the censoring margin is also increasing in restrictiveness; for instance, at the median distance, the probability of observing bilateral trade is 12.6 percentage points lower on routes with policy barriers in the second quartile of the STRI distribution. On routes in the third and fourth quartiles, respectively, the probability is lower by 16.7 and 25.2 percentage points as compared to open routes. The 'choking' effect of policy barriers is thus a significant driver of the overall effect on maritime transport costs.
As we would expect, the impact on the censoring probability amplifies the effect of policy on the truncated mean (panel B); for instance, conditional on observing trade, expected transport costs are 43.2 percent higher on restrictive routes but overall expected transport costs, including zero trade flows, are higher (49.7 percent) on a comparable route (column 3). This amplification effect holds for every combination of distance and policy restrictiveness, though the relative contribution of each margin may differ. The results across panels A-C show that, for any given distance, costs are increasing in restrictiveness along all three margins, and that effects on the uncensored and censored observations reinforce each other. At the same time there is substantial heterogeneity in these effects along the distance dimension. In particular, the cost-inflating effect is considerably stronger for proximate country pairs and attenuates for faraway destinations. Longer distances also imply ceteris paribus higher marginal costs and hence higher MTCs. In many demand systems, however, the preferences of consumers of liner services are likely to be more elastic at higher MTCs. The fact that carriers will find it optimal to charge lower mark-ups when demand is more elastic implies that the cost-inflating effect of policy barriers is falling with distance. Atkin and Donaldson (2014) find a similar pattern of mark-ups declining with distance in intranational trade and provide a similar rationale.
Notice that along the extensive margin, the likelihood of observing a positive trade flow falls with distance for any given level of restrictiveness (panel C). This is exactly what we would expect, even though the distance heterogeneity is not very pronounced. For instance, the 16.8 percentage points decrease in censoring probability for country pairs at the 95 th distance percentile is about 12 percent higher than the 15 percentage points decrease for nearby countries (5 th percentile, panel C row 2).
Distance and Other Covariates
In addition to influencing maritime transport costs through the effect of policy, distance also has a direct effect on costs. In the main specification, per-unit trade cost increase by 2.3 percent if bilateral distance between country pairs increases by 10 percent. In other words, everything else equal, MTCs on the New Zealand-Panama route are approximately 2$/tonne higher than on the New Zealand-Peru route, which is some 676km shorter.
Regarding the marginal effects of other covariates, the need for transhipment in order to connect two countries raises per-unit MTCs by around 28.3 percent, which constitutes a substantial premium. Concerning economies of scale, a 10 percent increase in the total volume of seaborne imports reduces per-unit MTCs by 1.4 percent.
Second Stage: Estimating Seaborne Trade Flows
In the second stage of our analysis, we use a standard gravity framework to assess the impact of maritime transport costs on seaborne trade flows. Compared to earlier studies that have looked at the effect of MTCs on seaborne trade flows 18 , the two-step approach allows us to obtain more accurate impact effects not only with respect to policy barriers but also with regard to conventional gravity variables such as distance. Following the approach in Limao and Venables (2001), we address the endogeneity of transport costs by using predicted values of MTCs from the first stage, which are not afflicted by reverse causality. 
Data and Estimation
We base our estimation on the structural gravity model as developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in which imports are a function of sectoral output, expenditure, and a trade cost function that comprises of bilateral trade barriers as well as inward and outward multilateral resistance terms. A key property of this framework is trade separability, which defines this structural relationship for each product category k.
We specify the trade cost function ( ) τ ⋅ to include distance, contiguity, membership in a preferential trade agreement (PTA), tariff rates, and maritime transport costs. 20 As is standard in the literature, we add an error term multiplicatively and estimate equation (2) (2006) , and Korinek and Sourdin (2009) . This approach raises doubts about the exclusion restriction because the value of trade (price times quantity) is likely to be correlated with the unit value of goods. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2007) estimate transport costs and trade simultaneously but this approach, too, is problematic since it is not the amount of individual products (or HS-2/4 lines) that creates economies of scale in liner shipping but rather the total amount of bilateral trade. 20 Other standard gravity variables such as common language or common religion exhibit little variation and are partly collinear with other variables in our specific sample, as both importing countries (United States, New Zealand) are English-speaking and party to several PTAs.
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), assuming the conditional mean of imports can be modelled as described:
[ ] 
The gravity-type variables are self-explanatory but further details including data sources can again be found in Annex 3. We use the average applied tariff between country-pairs for product k. PTA is a dummy variable indicating whether a bilateral route is covered by any of the main preferential agreements to which the US and New Zealand are party, namely NAFTA, CAFTA, and other 'closer economic relations' (CER) agreements. 
Results
We obtain a rich set of results that illustrate how natural and policy barriers affect seaborne trade flows. By linking the first-stage tobit estimates with second-stage PPML estimates, we are able to disentangle direct and indirect effects (through transport costs) and trace out how these change across different samples.
As a point of reference, we start by estimating equation (3) using actual MTC data, as if maritime transport costs were exogenous to trade flows (Table 4 , col. 1-3). All variables exhibit the correct sign and most of them are significant at the 1 percent level. Notice that the coefficient on contiguity is also correctly signed for the specific sample of exclusively seaborne imports, since surface transport (road trucking) is arguably the most efficient transport mode for countries sharing a border. This result confirms a pattern often stated in the literature, namely that the importance of maritime transport decreases significantly when two trading partners share a common border (Hummels, 2007) .
However, the partial effect of maritime transport costs may be biased because of the reverse causality arising from the fact that larger volumes shipped are associated with lower average costs. In order to obtain an unbiased estimate in the trade gravity equation, we use predicted values of MTCs from the first stage (col. 4-6) . From the specifications with predicted transport costs, we obtain three main results: first, the marginal effect of transport costs on trade flows differs across the sub-samples; in particular, in the full sample the coefficient is lower compared to the one using actual MTCs but the value of trade is much more sensitive to transport costs in the positive trade flow sample. Second, the impact of conventional gravity variables such as geography and trade policy is substantially altered once transport costs are properly controlled for. Third, the two-stage approach allows us to quantify correctly the overall impact on trade flows of key determinants such as distance and investment restrictions. We discuss each result in turn. First, in the full sample including zero trade observations, the effect of transport costs on the value of imports is lower when predicted values of MTCs are employed (columns 4 and 5) as the effect of reverse causality is purged or at least substantially reduced. In the PPML specifications, coefficients on continuous variables can be interpreted as elasticities, i.e. a 1 percent increase in maritime transport costs would reduce imports by 0.51 percent (col.5).
This cost effect strengthens substantially once zero trade observations are excluded. Hence, while maritime transport costs do play a role in affecting the extensive margin, they are quantitatively even more important as drivers of the intensive margin (column 6).
Second, the predicted values of MTCs used in models 4-6 properly include the effect of variables such as distance or contiguity whose impact on the value of trade should mainly work through raising transport costs. This is exactly what we find. Compared to their coefficients in columns 1-3, the direct effect of distance and contiguity either vanishes or is substantially reduced. The significant distance coefficient in column 4 may reflect a selection effect 22 but distance is insignificant in columns 5 and 6. Contiguity has a direct effect only in the full sample including zero trade flows but no effect once only positive seaborne trade flows are considered, which is precisely what we would expect. In contrast, the presence of a PTA directly affects trade flows without raising transport costs, and this prediction is borne out by the fact that the PTA coefficient is significant and of roughly equal size across all 6 columns. These results demonstrate the usefulness of the two-step approach for correctly quantifying the impact on trade flows of policy measures and other gravity variables. For instance, if one simply estimated the effect of distance on trade flows, conditional on contiguity, PTAs and tariffs, but not otherwise accounting for maritime transport costs, one would obtain a distance elasticity of trade of -3.1. In contrast, the distance elasticity implied by model 4 in Table 4 , which incorporates both the main effect through MTCs as well as a potential direct effect, would amount to -1.6 only. 23 Thus without taking proper account of MTCs, estimates of distance elasticities may be severely biased.
24
Of particular interest is a quantification of the effect of investment restrictions on seaborne trade as these kinds of frictions have not been studied before. Table 5 shows that the trade depressing effects, in percentage terms, of policy barriers through raising transport costs is sizable. 25 Across all three columns, the effect of policy restrictiveness is nonlinear but 22 In addition to the first-order effect of distance on marginal costs, which is rolled into predicted MTCs, distance may exert a direct effect through specialisation. Harrigan (2010) has shown that in the presence of alternative transport modes which differ in their cost/speed trade-off, and consumers valuing timeliness of delivery, distance will play a role in determining comparative advantage. Using US import data, Harrigan shows that faraway exporters have a relatively high market share in goods which are transported by air (as opposed to surface), implying that in a sample restricted to seaborne trade flows and controlling for contiguity, distance exerts a negative effect via comparative advantage specialization. 23 We compute this quantity by calculating the marginal effect on the censored mean with respect to distance in elasticity terms from the first stage (unrestricted and restricted sample) and then multiply the results with the cost elasticity of trade from the second stage as shown in columns 4 and 5, respectively. In so doing we take care of the retransformation problem on both sides of the first-stage equation, for what is needed is the elasticity of MTCs with respect to distance while the estimable equation is framed in terms of log(MTC) on log(distance). 24 Egger (2008) has shown in a general gravity framework (not specific to seaborne trade) that the marginal effect of distance may differ across country pairs. Here we argue that, heterogeneous effects notwithstanding, even the average effect may be biased if distance were solely and directly used as a transport cost proxy. 25 For columns 1 and 2, we compute this quantity by first calculating, for each STRI quartile, the marginal effect on the censored expected value of trade costs in the first stage, and then evaluate the predictive margins for the value of imports in the second stage at each of these values for predicted MTC. We then express the change in monotonically increasing, as we would expect. In the main specification based on the full sample and estimated transport costs (Table 4 col. 5), the value of imports may be lower by up to 46 percent on highly restrictive routes (Table 5 col.2) solely based on the indirect effect through MTC. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Contrary to popular belief, international trade in liner shipping services is still restricted by policy. In particular, the impact of widespread investment restrictions in the shipping sector has not been studied in the literature. This paper demonstrates that such policy measures have a significant effect in terms of raising maritime transport costs and, hence, lowering seaborne trade flows. Since the bulk of global merchandise goods trade is seaborne, the magnitude of frictions identified in this paper and their spatial distribution have important ramifications for connectivity and market integration.
Trade policy restrictions in mode 3 raise maritime transport costs by up to 50 percent, with pronounced heterogeneity of this effect along the distance dimension. A substantial part of the detrimental effect of policy barriers emanates from increasing the probability that an observation is being censored; in other words, regulatory measures inhibit seaborne trade these predictive margins in the second stage in percentage terms. For column 3, we follow in principle the same procedure but the correct quantities with respect to this sample are now the marginal effect on the truncated expectation as obtained from the restricted sample of the first stage. On retransformation to the correct quantities see Note 26 above.
altogether on a particular bilateral route. We also find transhipment requirements and total import volume to be significant determinants of maritime transport costs but the magnitude of these effects is secondary compared to the effects of policy barriers and distance.
In a second step, we examine the effect of maritime transport costs on seaborne imports.
Using predicted values from the previous transport cost equation to address the reverse causality induced by scale economies in liner shipping, we estimate that policy restrictiveness lowers trade flows by up to 46 percent. The two-step approach turns out to be crucial for obtaining correct impact effects not only with respect to policy barriers but also with regard to conventional gravity variables such as distance.
Our finding that protection persists and matters in maritime transport is relevant for both 
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Tariffs and Maritime Transport Costs
Country coverage
Liner Shipping Conferences
Our estimation sample encompasses 118 routes. A carrier agreement is active on 37 routes, see Source: Own calculation from CI Online database (2010). * Agreements for which tariff filing is required. Information on applied service trade policies in the maritime shipping sector is taken from the Services Trade Restrictions Database described in Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2014) ; technical details are discussed in a Guide to this database (Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo, 2012) . Source: Authors' calculation. Notes: significance levels: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. The dependant variable is the log of per-unit maritime transport cost expressed in dollars per kilogram. The variables Distance, Total import volume and Absolute Import Imbalance are in logarithms. All models are estimated by IV tobit using MFN simple average tariffs and log of non-seaborne import volume as instruments for total seaborne import volume. The R-squared is McFadden's pseudo R-squared. Estimations use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors which are clustered at the country-pair level. Origin, destination and commodity fixed-effects as well as intercepts are included in all models but not reported.
Construction of the liner shipping STRI in mode 3
